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I D E A S

R E T H IN K IN G
P R IV A C Y
William H.Simon

A

n xie ty abou t surveillance and

data mining has led many to em
brace implausibly expansive and rigid
conceptions of privacy. The premises
of some current privacy arguments
do not fit well with the broader politi
cal commitments of those who make
them. In particular, liberals seem to
have lost touch with the reservations
about privacy expressed in the social
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criticism of some decades ago. They
seem unable to imagine that preoccu
pation with privacy might amount to a
“pursuit of loneliness" or how "eyes on
the street” might have reassuring con
notations. Without denying the impor
tance of the effort to define and secure
privacy values, I want to catalogue and
push back against some key rhetorical
tropes that distort current discussion
and practice.
One problem is that privacy de
fenses often imply a degree of pes
simism about the state inconsistent
with the strong general public regu
latory and social-welfare roles that
many defenders favor. Another is a

sentimental disposition toward past
convention that obscures the potential
contributions of new technologies to
both order and justice. And a third is a
narrow conception of personality that
exalts extreme individual control over
information at the expense of sharing
and sociability.
P A R A N O IA

In urban areas, most people’s activity
outdoors and in the common spaces of
buildings is recorded most of the time.
Surveillance cameras are everywhere.
W hen people move around, their
paths are registered on building ac
cess cards or subway fare cards or au-
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tomobile toll devices. Their telephone
and email communications, Internet
searches, and movements are tracked
by telephone companies and other
intermediaries. All their credit card
transactions—which, for many peo
ple, means nearly all of their transac
tions—are documented by time, place,
and substance. The health system ex
tracts and records detailed informa
tion about their psychic and bodily
functions. Anyone arrested, and many
who fear arrest, in the criminal justice
system typically surrender a variety of
personal information and often have
to submit to ongoing monitoring.
Even within the home, water and en
ergy consumption are monitored, and
some people choose to install cameras
to monitor children or protect against
burglars.
To many people, this society looks
like the panopticon—a prison de
signed as a circular tower so that the
inmates can be easily observed by a
centrally located authority figure. Jer
emy Bentham originated the panopti
con idea as a low-cost form of subju
gation for convicted criminals. Michel
Foucault adopted it as a metaphor for
what he regarded as the insidiously
pervasive forms of social control in
contemporary society. To him, schools,
hospitals, workplaces, government
agencies all engaged in repressive
forms of surveillance analogous to the
panopticon.
In the United States, paranoid po
litical style has been associated tra
ditionally with the right and the less
educated. But Foucault helped make
it attractive to liberal intellectuals. His
contribution was largely a matter of
style. Foucault was the most moralistic
of social theorists, but he purported to
disdain morality ("normativity") and
refused to acknowledge, much less de
fend, the moral implications of his ar
guments. He gave intellectual respect
ability to the three principal tropes of
the paranoid style.
First, there is the idea of guilt by
association. The resemblance be
tween some feature of a strikingly
BOSTONREVIEW.NET

cruel or crackpot regime of the past
or in fiction—especially in Nineteen
Eighty-Four—and a more ambiguous
contemporary one is emphasized in
order to condemn the latter. Thus, the
elaborate individualized calibration of
tortures in eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury penology is used to make us
feel uncomfortable about the gradu
ated responses to noncompliance in
contemporary drug treatment courts.
George Orwell’s image of television
cameras transmitting images from in
side the home to the political police is
used to induce anxiety about devices
that monitor electricity usage so that
the hot water tank will re-heat during
off-peak hours.

The paranoid political
style has been associated
w ith the right. Foucault
brought it to liberals.

The second trope of the paranoid
style is the portrayal of virtually all
tacit social pressure as insidious.
What people experience as voluntary
choice is substantially conditioned
by unconscious internalized disposi
tions to conform to norms, and a key
mechanism of such conformity is the
actual, imagined, or anticipated gaze
of others. Almost everyone who thinks
about it recognizes that such pressures
are potentially benign, but people dif
fer in their rhetorical predispositions
toward them. The individualist streak
in American culture tends to exalt in
dividual choice in a way that makes
social influence suspect.
Foucault disdained individual
ism, but he introduced a conception
of power that was so vague and sin
ister that it could be applied to make
almost any social force seem creepy.
When Neil Richards writes in the Har
vard Law Review that surveillance "af
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fects the power dynamic between the
watcher and the watched, giving the
watcher greater power to influence or
direct the subject of surveillance,” he
is channeling Foucault. So is Julie Co
hen, when she writes in the Stanford
Law Review: "Pervasive monitoring of
every first move or false start will, at
the margin, incline choices toward the
bland and the mainstream."
We have come a far cry from Jane
Jacobs’s idea of “eyes on the street"
as the critical foundation of urban
vibrancy. For Jacobs, the experience
of being observed by diverse strang
ers induces not anxiety or timidity
but an empowering sense of security
and stimulation. It makes people will
ing to go out into new situations and
to experiment with new behaviors.
Eyes-on-the-street implies a tacit social
pact that people will intervene to pro
tect each other's safety but that they
will refrain from judging their peers'
non-dangerous behavior. Electronic
surveillance is not precisely the same
thing as Jacobean eyes-on-the-street,
but it does offer the combination of
potentially benign intervention and
the absence of censorious judgment
that Jacobs saw as conducive to auton
omy.
The third trope of the paranoid
style is the slippery slope argument.
The idea is that an innocuous step in a
feared direction will inexorably lead to
further steps that end in catastrophe.
As The Music Man (1962) puts it in
explaining why a pool table will lead
to moral collapse in River City, Iowa,
"medicinal wine from a teaspoon,
then beer from a bottle.” In this spirit,
Daniel Solove in Nothing to Hide (2011)
explains why broad surveillance is a
threat even when limited to detection
of unlawful activity. First, surveillance
will sometimes lead to mistaken con
clusions that will harm innocent peo
ple. Second, since “everyone violates
the law sometimes” (think of moder
ate speeding on the highway), surveil
lance will lead to over-enforcement
of low-stakes laws (presumably by
lowering the costs of enforcement), or
SEP / OCT 2 0 14
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perhaps the use of threats of enforce
ment of minor misconduct to force
people to give up rights (as for ex
ample, where police threaten to bring
unrelated charges in order to induce a
witness or co-conspirator to cooperate
in the prosecution of another). And
finally, even if we authorize broad
surveillance for legitimate purposes,
officials will use the authorization as
an excuse to extend their activities in
illegitimate ways.
Yet, slippery slope arguments can
be made against virtually any kind of
law enforcement. Most law enforce
ment infringes privacy. ("Murder is
the most private act a man can com
mit," William Faulkner wrote.) And
most law enforcement powers have
the potential for abuse. What we can
reasonably ask is, first, that the prac
tices are calibrated effectively to iden
tify wrongdoers; second, that the bur
den they put on law-abiding people is
fairly distributed; and third, that of
ficials are accountable for the lawful
ness of their conduct both in design
ing and in implementing the practices.
The capacity of broad-based elec
tronic surveillance—the sort that col
lects data on large or indeterminate
numbers of people who are not identi
fied in advance—to satisfy these con
ditions is in some respects higher than
that of the more targeted and reactive
approaches that privacy advocates
prefer. Such approaches rely heav
ily on personal observation by police
and witnesses, reports by informants
of self-inculpatory statements by sus
pects, and confessions. But these strat
egies have their shortcomings. Schol
ars in recent years have emphasized
the fallibility of human memory and
observation. Witness reports of con
duct by strangers are often mistaken
and influenced by investigators. Those
who report self-inculpatory state
ments often have dubious motiva
tions, and, with surprising frequency,
even confessions prove unreliable.
Inferences from broad-based elec
tronic surveillance are not infallible,
but they are often more reliable than
60
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reports of personal observation, and
they can be less intrusive. Computers
programmed to identify and photo
graph red light violations make much
more reliable determinations of the
violation than a police officer relying
on his own observation. And they are
less intrusive: the camera can be set
to record only when there’s a viola
tion, whereas a police officer would
observe and remember much more.
Yet many civil libertarians, including
some ACLU affiliates, oppose them.
One of their key arguments is that
the systems generate tickets in many
situations where the driver might
have had an excuse for not stopping
in time that would have persuaded a

Broad-based
surveillance distributes
its burdens widely,
which may be fairer.

police officer to dismiss the violation.
(The case for excuse can still be made
in court, but a court appearance would
cost more than the ticket for many.)
The argument is not frivolous, but it
is a curiosity typical of this field that
people concerned about the abuse of
state power often oppose new technol
ogy in favor of procedures that give of
ficials more discretion.
For democratic accountability,
panopticon-style surveillance has an
underappreciated advantage. It may
more easily accommodate transpar
ency. Electronic surveillance is gov
erned by fully specified algorithms.
Thus, disclosure of the algorithms
gives a full picture of the practices. By
contrast, when government agents are
told to scan for suspicious behavior,
we know very little about what criteria
they are using. Even if we require the
agents to articulate their criteria, they
may be unable to do so comprehen

sively. The concern is not just about
good faith, but also about uncon
scious predisposition. Psychologists
have provided extensive evidence of
pervasive, unconscious bias based on
race and other social stereotypes and
stigma. Algorithm-governed electronic
surveillance has no such bias.
The panopticon can be developed
in ways Foucault never imagined to
discipline the watchers as well as the
watched. The most vocal demands for
electronic surveillance in prisons these
days come from prisoners and their ad
vocates. Lawsuits challenging physical
abuse by guards often produce court
orders requiring more video cameras
and restricting guards' ability to take
prisoners to areas where they are not
recorded. People who worry about co
erced confessions favor mandatory tap
ing of police interviews of suspects, and
many jurisdictions have adopted this
practice. One response to complaints of
racial profiling in traffic stops has been
to have police wear body cameras that
tape every encounter. Some civil liber
tarians oppose such practices, but those
who favor them are trying to restrain
state power, not enlarge it.
More generally, broad-reach elec
tronic mechanisms have an advantage
in addressing the danger that surveil
lance will be unfairly concentrated on
particular groups; targeting criteria,
rather than reflecting rigorous efforts
to identify wrongdoers, may reflect
cognitive bias or group animus. More
over, even when the criteria are opti
mally calculated to identify wrongdo
ers, they may be unfair to law-abiding
people who happen to share some
superficial characteristic with wrong
doers. Thus, law-abiding blacks com
plain that they are unfairly burdened
by stop-and-frisk tactics, and law-abid
ing Muslims make similar complaints
about anti-terrorism surveillance.
Such problems are more tractable
with broad-based electronic surveil
lance. Because it is broad-based, it dis
tributes some of its burdens widely.
This may be intrinsically fairer, and it
operates as a political safeguard, mak-
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ing effective protest more likely in
cases of abuse. Because it is electronic,
the efficacy of the criteria can be more
easily investigated, and their effect on
law-abiding people can be more accu
rately documented. Thus, plaintiffs in
challenges to stop-and-frisk practices
analyze electronically recorded data
on racial incidence and "hit rates" to
argue that the criteria are biased and
the effects racially skewed. Remedies
in such cases typically require more
extensive recording.
The critics' preoccupation w ith
the dangers of state oppression often
leads them to overlook the dangers
of private abuse of surveillance. They
have a surprisingly difficult time com
ing up with actual examples of serious
harm from governm ent surveillance
abuse. Instead, they tend to talk about
the "chilling effect" from awareness of
surveillance.
By contrast, there have been many
examples of serious harm from pri
vate abuse of personal inform ation

gained from digital sources. At least
one person has committed suicide as
a consequence of the Internet publica
tion of video showing him engaged in
sexual activity. Many people have been
humiliated by the public release of a
private recording of intimate conduct,
and blackmail based on threats of such
disclosure has emerged as a common
practice. Some of this private abuse
is and should be illegal. But the legal
prohibitions can only be enforced if
the government has some of the sur
veillance capacities that critics decry.
Illicit recording and distribution can
only be restrained if the wrongdoers
can be identified and their actions ef
fectively restrained. Less compromis
ing critics would deny governm ent
these capacities.
W ith low crime rates and small
risks of terrorism in the United States,
privacy advocates do not feel com
pelled to address the potential chill
ing effect on speech and conduct that
arises from fear of private lawlessness,
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but we do not have to look far to see
examples of such an effect abroad and
to recognize that its m agnitude de
pends on the effectiveness of public
law enforcement. To the extent that
law enforcement is enhanced by sur
veillance, we ought to recognize the
possibility of a warm ing effect that
strengthens people’s confidence that
they can act and speak without fear of
private aggression.
N O STA LG IA

Harm from surveillance that intrudes
on core areas of solitude and intimacy
is easy to identify. Such intrusion is
rightly subject to high burdens of jus
tification. But most surveillance is dif
ferent. Often it involves conduct sub
ject to ordinary observation in public
or information that a person has will
ingly provided to strangers, often to
facilitate business or commercial deal
ings.
Once we go beyond the solitaryintimate realm, it becomes harder to
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delimit the scope of privacy concerns.
A common approach is to privilege as
sumptions based on past experience.
Thus, the Supreme Court elaborates
the constitutional prohibition of “un
reasonable searches and seizures" by
looking to "expectations of privacy."
Expectations are a function of custom.
It follows that telescopically aided air
plane surveillance of someone in his
backyard is generally OK because we
are used to telescopes and airplanes
flying over, but using thermal im
aging technology to look inside the
house requires a warrant because it is
a technology to which we are not yet
habituated. Helen Nissenbaum, in her
highly regarded Privacy in Context,
takes a similar approach. Her guid
ing principle is "contextual integrity,”
which means the implicit customary
norms in any given sphere of activity.
For example, a highway toll collector
seeing contraband in the backseat of a
car does not pose a problem to privacy
because such observation is familiar,
but police examination of electronic
toll records to determine whether the

car was near the scene of a crime at the
relevant time would pose a problem.
Here again we see people of gener
ally liberal views resorting to conser
vative rhetorical and theoretical tropes
when it comes to privacy. Most privacy
advocates probably consider the ap
peal to custom in arguments about the
death penalty or gay marriage as a sign
of intellectual bankruptcy. The distinc
tions that the customary principle pro
duces seem arbitrary in relation to any
substantive conception of privacy.
The substantive conception to
which the advocates are most drawn
is the notion of a right to control infor
mation about one's self. James Whit
man argues in the Yale Law Journal
that this conception evolved through
the democratization of aristocratic val
ues. The aristocrat’s sense of self-worth
and dignity depended on respect from
peers and deference from subordi
nates, and both were a function of his
public image. Image was thus treated
as a kind of personal property. Whit
man says this view continues to influ
ence the European middle class in the

Curio
Meghan Privitello
Caravan of daisies, carafe of desires, this room is a catalogue of
belonging. How many vehicles are meant to hold us together, to bring
us toward—the light, wavering, is a day dress that addresses the parallel
lines the body cannot live within. These curvatures are beginning to
look like impassable highways. We are broken down on the side of the
road carrying on to the sky to transfix our motors into a lover's toes,
a small drop of blood, carrion we can keep sweetly in a trunk. We
are carried by the talons of picture frames, drawers of tissue paper, of
handprint cement. The sentiment is oversized. So what. What can we
sew to what to stay whole enough to befriend the circles? I'm afraid 1 am
perpendicular to happiness which means my axis is always preoccupied.
This belonging is not dimensional. How demented we have become
among our bell jars, our paper dolls, our replicas of horses and saints. If
we get around to withholding our tongues from each other we can still
be alive, can describe ourselves into/as a corner. With our havings, our
holdings, we are starting to become citizens of nowhere. With love we
are still ordinary. With lamp-stands and ashcans we are navy blue at best.
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age of equal citizenship. As the ideal
was democratized, it came to be seen
as a foundation for self-expression and
individual development.
European law evolved to express
this cultural change. Whitman showed
that the idea of a right to control one's
public image underlies French and
German privacy law, and it appears to
animate European Union privacy law,
which advocates admire for its stron
ger protections than those of U.S. law.
For example, French and German law
impose stricter limits on credit report
ing and the use of consumer data than
U.S. law. The EU directive mandates
that individuals be given notice of the
data collection practices of those with
whom they deal and rights to correct
erroneous data about them. More
controversially, a proposed revision
prohibits decisions based "solely on
automatic data processing”for various
purposes, including employment and
credit. By contrast, U.S. law tends to be
less protective and less general. Its pri
vacy law tends to be sector-based, with
distinctive regulations for health care,
education, law enforcement, and other
fields.
Whitman associates the weaker in
fluence of the idea of personal-image
control in the United States with the
stronger influence here of competing
libertarian notions that broadly pro
tect speech and publication. Expan
sive notions of privacy require a more
active state to enforce them. This was
recently illustrated by a decision of
the EU Court of Justice holding that
the "right to be forgotten" may require
removal from an Internet website of
true but "no longer relevant” informa
tion about the plaintiff's default on a
debt. The prospect of courts review
ing Internet data to determine when
personal information is "no longer
relevant” has emphasized the poten
tial conflict between privacy and other
civil rights.
But reservations about the broad
conception of dignity Whitman de
scribes go deeper. There is a powerful
moral objection to it grounded in ide-
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als of sociability. Even in Europe, dur
ing the period in which the ideal was
democratized, there was a prom inent
critique of it. A character in a nine
teenth-century English novel preoccu
pied with controlling his public image
is likely to be a charlatan or a loser.
Not for nothing is Sherlock Holmes
the most prominent hero in the canon.
His talents are devoted to invading the
privacy of those who would use their
image-management rights to exploit
others. And as he teaches that the fa
cade of self-presentation can be pen
etrated by observation and analysis of
such matters as frayed cuffs, scratches
on a watch, or a halting gait, he sets
up as a competing value the capacity
to know and deal with people on our
terms as well as theirs.
Even among innocuous characters,
preoccupation w ith self-image con
trol often appears as a pathology that
inhibits rather than enhances self-ex
pression and development. This preoc
cupation is associated with a rejection
of urban life and its spontaneity and
diversity. Think of Sir Leicester Deb
lock in Bleak House and Sir Walter El
liot in Persuasion, minor nobles cling
ing to aristocratic ideals. They know
that the best way to m aintain control
of your image is to avoid contact with
strangers, people you have no power
over, and clever people who m ight
penetrate your disguises. To embrace
the vitality of the city requires a will
ingness to give up some control over
one’s image and accept risks of being
understood and dealt w ith on term s
that are not your own. In both books,
the unwillingness to run these risks is
associated with personal stultification.
If the right to control personal in
form ation was extended in Europe
from the aristocracy to the rest of the
society, it was at the same time diluted
for everyone. W hen Darcy leaves his
estate at Pemberley, he exits a world
in which he is "seen as he chooses to
be seen,” as the scoundrel W ickham
puts it enviously. In the middle class
world of Meryton, he is subjected to
eavesdropping and gossip (the social
BOSTONREVIEW.NET

media of yesteryear). And he is con
fronted by people, notably Lizzie Bennet, who dare to "read [his] character”
back to him in their own manner. In
the process of responding, he grows
and finds rom antic fulfillm ent but
only by giving up control. Pride and
Prejudice, perhaps the most popular
novel w ritten in English, is a treatise
on the impossibility and undesirabil
ity of giving anyone control over the
information about himself.

Expansive privacy
requires m ore active
state enforcem ent.

As there are emotional and social
benefits to giving up control over per
sonal inform ation, so there are eco
nomic benefits. It is not unfair to take
account of people’s credit histories in
making loan decisions. W hen lenders
do this effectively, credit is, on average,
cheaper. Nor does it seem especially
unfair to take account of a factor such
as the purchase of home safety devices
that predicts relevant behavior like re
payment of a loan. Some uses of per
sonal inform ation should be prohib
ited. W here predictive inform ation
tracks axes of historical subordination,
such as race and gender, there may be
good reason to limit their use, as the
law does with respect to various insur
ance decisions. The reason, however,
has to do with concerns about subor
dination, not some broad right of pri
vacy. The U.S. sector-based approach is
better equipped to take account of the
varying and competing stakes than the
EU categorical one.
IN D IV ID U A L IS M

A major goal of many privacy propo
nents is to limit collection of personal
data either by regulations requiring
affirmative consent for such collection
or by technology that limits reading
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or retaining the data. They don’t want
Google to be able to analyze people's
Internet searches or state govern
ments to be able to analyze highway
toll paym ent data w ithout specific
consent, or perhaps a warrant. They
also advocate technologies such as the
hardware-software package offered by
the Freedom Box Foundation designed
to enable users to thw art mining of
their data over the Internet.
Advocates object m ost strongly
to data collection designed to yield
specific conclusions about the indi
vidual, but they persist even w hen
anonymized data is used to assess gen
eral patterns. Since anonym ization
is never perfectly secure, it exposes
people to risk. Moreover, the privacy
norm sometimes shades into a prop
erty norm. It turns out that some peo
ple carry around economically valu
able information in their bodies—for
example, the DNA code for an enzyme
with therapeutic potential— and that
information about everyone's conduct
and physical condition can, when ag
gregated, be sold for substantial sums.
For some, the extraction of such in
formation without consent looks like
expropriation of property. They would
like to see explicit extension of prop
erty rights to require consent and
compensation for use of personal in
formation. In Who Owns the Future?
(2014) Jaron Lanier develops this line
of thought, suggesting that we create
institutions that enable individuals
to monetize their personal data—in
dividual accounts would be credited
every time a piece of data is used.
In addressing such issues, a lot de
pends on how we understand consent.
Consent can mean clicking on an “I
agree to the term s” button that refers
to a mass of small-print boilerplate
that hardly anyone can be expected to
read. Or it may mean simply the fail
ure to find and click on the button that
says "I refuse consent." The advocates
w ant som ething m ore dem anding.
Moreover, they don't want the cost of
the decision to be too high. If insist
ing on privacy means exclusion from
SEP / OCT 2014
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Google’s search tool or Amazon's retail
service, many proponents would view
that as unfair. If Google or Amazon
charged a price for not m ining your
data, many would call it extortion—
like asking someone to pay in order
not to be assaulted. So the idea of “con
sent" touches on deep and unresolved
issues of entitlement to information.
Such issues have arisen in connec
tion w ith employer-sponsored well
ness program s that encourage em 
ployees to get checkups that include
a "health risk assessment” designed to
generate prophylactic advice. At Penn
sylvania State University such a pro
gram recently provoked a wave of pri
vacy protests, apparently directed to
parts of a questionnaire that addressed
m arital and job-related problem s,
among other things. The protesters
also objected that the questionnaires
would be analyzed by an outside con
sultant, even though the information
would be subject to the confidentiality
provisions of the federal Health Insur
ance Portability and Accountability
64
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Act. The University allowed people to
refuse to participate subject to a $100
per month surcharge.
No doubt such programs may be
unnecessarily intrusive and may not
safeguard information adequately, but

The strong privacy
position has disturbing
implications fo r
medical research.

the objections made in this case do not
appear to have depended on such con
cerns. The $100 surcharge was based
on an estim ate of the average addi
tional health costs attributable to re
fusal to participate. The premise of the
protests seems to have been that the
interest in not disclosing this informa
tion even under substantial safeguards
is im portant enough that those who

disclose should be asked to subsidize
those who do not.
Social change often raises new
questions about rights. W hen air
planes first appeared over people’s
homes, the question arose w hether
they w ere trespassing; w hen zon
ing codes limited what owners could
build on their land, the question arose
w hether governm ent had taken a
portion of the individual's property
and were thus obliged to compensate
them. More often than not, the law
has refused to recognize claims of this
sort. One reason has been fear that
they would preclude many generally
advantageous social practices. Another
has been the belief that, except where
the costs imposed by the practices cu
mulate visibly on particular individu
als or groups, they are likely to even
out over the long run. In a famous
opinion declining to hold that a regu
lation of coal mining violated property
rights, justice Holmes spoke of an “av
erage reciprocity of advantage” that
over time obviated the need for indi-
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vidual compensation by distributing
benefits evenly across the society.
The reciprocity theme occasion
ally surfaces in privacy discussion.
Lanier's proposal to monetize data
arises from a sense of injustice about
the relative rewards to, on the one
hand, data-mining entrepreneurs and
high-tech knowledge workers, and on
the other, the masses of people whose
principal material endowment may be
their control over their own personal
information. In the health sector, doc
tors have been caught trying to derive
patent rights from information em
bedded in their patients’DNA without
informing the patients.
But privacy advocates rarely ac
knowledge the possibility that aver
age reciprocity of advantage will obvi
ate over time the need for individual
compensation in some areas. Might it
be the case, as with airplanes and zon
ing laws, that people will do better if
individual data (anonymized where
appropriate) is made freely available
except where risks to individuals are
unreasonably high or gains or losses
are detectably concentrated? There
will always be a risk that some data
will be disclosed in harmful ways,
such as when personal data leaks out
because of ineffective anonymization.
However, the key question is whether
we will make a social judgment about
what level of risk is reasonable or
whether we shall accord property
rights that allow each individual to
make her own risk calculus with re
spect to her own data.
The latter approach would likely
preclude valuable practices in ways
analogous to what would happen if
airlines had to get owners’consent for
passing over private property. More
over, strengthening rights in personal
data could exacerbate, rather than mit
igate, distributive fairness concerns.
While it is surely unfair for doctors
to earn large capital gains from DNA
extracted without consent, wouldn’t it
also be unfair (admittedly in a lower
key) for Freedom Box users to benefit
from the Center for Disease Control's
BOSTONREVIEW.NET

mining of Google searches for new
viruses while denying access to their
own Internet searches?
The strong privacy position has
disturbing implications for medical
research. In the past, medicine has
strongly separated research from treat
ment. Research is paradigmatically as
sociated with randomized controlled
clinical trials. Treatment experience
has been considered less useful to
research because treatment records
do not describe the condition of the
patient or the nature of the interven
tion with enough specificity to permit
rigorous comparisons. But informa
tion technology is removing this limi
tation, and, as the capacity to analyze
treatment information rigorously in
creases, the quality of research could
improve as its cost lowers.
However, this development is in
some tension with expansive concep
tions of privacy. A prominent group
of bioethicists led by Ruth Faden of
Johns Hopkins has recently argued
that the emerging “learning health
care system" will require a moral
framework that "departjs] in impor
tant respects from contem porary
conceptions of clinical and research
ethics.”A key component of the frame
work is a newly recognized obligation
on the part of patients to contribute to
medical research. The obligation in
volves a duty to permit disclosure and
use of anonymized treatment data for
research purposes and perhaps also
to undergo some unburdensome and
non-invasive examination and testing
required for research but not for indi
vidual treatment. (Anonymization is
unlikely to be effective with data made
generally available online, but regimes
involving selective and monitored
disclosure have proven reliable.) The
group justifies its proposal in terms of
reciprocity values. Since everyone has
a good prospect of benefiting from re
search, refusing to contribute to it is
unfair free riding.
Of course, the reciprocity idea as
sumes that researchers will make the
fruits of the research derived from
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patient information freely available.
People would be reluctant to agree to
make a gift of their information if re
searchers could use it to make them
selves rich. Effective constraints on
such conduct should be feasible. Much
medical research, including much of
the highest value research, has been
and continues to be done by salaried
employees of charitable corporations.
Applied in this context, Lanier’s
proposal to monetize individual data
looks unattractive. There is a dan
ger that a lot of valuable information
would be withheld or that the costs
of negotiating for it would divert a lot
of resources from research and treat
ment. It is not clear what the resulting
redistributive effects would be. Per
haps they would approximate a lottery
in which the only winners would be a
small number of people with little in
common except that they happened to
possess personal information that had
high research value at the moment. At
a point where we do not know who the
winners will be, we would all be bet
ter off giving up our chances for a big
payoff in return for assurance that we
will have free access to valuable infor
mation. We can do this by treating the
information as part of a common pool.
If it were the only way of transfer
ring resources to the economically
disadvantaged, monetization might
be defensible as a social policy of
desperation. But it seems a shabby
and inefficient substitute for decent
set of public institutions to discipline
monopolistic power, provide public
goods, and guarantee basic income,
education, and health care. Astra
Taylor argues compellingly in The
People's Platform (2014) that techno
futurist discourse suffers from deep
skepticism about public institutions.
Yet much of the current information
techno-structure, both good and bad,
is a product of publicly initiated and
supported research. There is no reason
to think that the capacities for creative
innovation that the futurists celebrate
cannot be applied effectively in the
public realm. BR
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